Peer-Reviewed Articles14click titles for PhilPapers · click journal names for links
gradable adjectivesdegrees of consciousnesssemantics of 'conscious'
forth.
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
CONSCIOUSNESS · STRUCTURE · REPRESENTATION
We argue 'conscious' sometimes functions as a minimal-standard gradable adjective. We relate this to issues concerning the semantics of 'what it's like' expressions and the metaphysics of degrees of consciousness.
sense-datum theoryrepresentational vehiclesacquaintancesensational qualities
2026
Analytic Philosophy
CONSCIOUSNESS · PERCEPTION · METAPHYSICS · EPISTEMOLOGY · REPRESENTATION
I develop a version of sense-datum theory on which sense-data are physical particulars, instantiate sensational qualities rather than sensible qualities, and are vehicles rather than objects of perception. I argue that this view warrants the label 'sense-datum theory' and resists traditional objections to sense-data.
conditional convergenceexpansionismlocationssupertasks
forth.
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
METAPHYSICS · MATHEMATICS
I develop a solution to a metaphysical puzzle concerning a famous mathematical theorem about infinite sums. I explain how my solution is motivated by some underexplored observations about how quantities relate to locations, and how it elucidates some classic puzzles about supertasks.
welfare subjectswelfare goodszero welfare
I argue that consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I defend this view from some objections concerning plants, death, and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero.
epistemic gapmetaethical pluralismethical naturalism
2025
The Importance of Being ConsciousOxford University Press
CONSCIOUSNESS · ETHICS · EPISTEMOLOGY
I argue that value facts about experiences—such as the fact that pain is bad—are wholly explainable by phenomenal facts. I explain how this yields a counterexample to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical theories hold for different classes of ethical facts.
structural factspoints of viewmathematical phenomenology
2024Erkenntnis89 (3): 1197–1216 CONSCIOUSNESS · STRUCTURE · REPRESENTATION · EPISTEMOLOGY I argue that purely structural facts about conscious experiences are objective phenomenal facts. They're objective in that they're understandable from any point of view, and phenomenal in that they partially characterize what it's like to have an experience.
degree structurephenomenal conceptsinexact knowledge
2023Philosophical Perspectives37 (1): 187–209
CONSCIOUSNESS · EPISTEMOLOGY
I argue that knowledge of what it's like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate. I motivate this degreed picture by appeal to (1) limits in epistemic abilities such as recognition, imagination, and inference, and (2) the semantics of 'knows what it's like' expressions. My view challenges standard assumptions about the acquisition conditions, requirements for mastery, and referential mechanisms of phenomenal concepts.
degreesmultidimensionalitysubjectivity
2023CONSCIOUSNESS · METAPHYSICS
I develop an analysis of what it means for consciousness to come in degrees. I argue that standard objections to degrees of consciousness trade upon confusions about the relationship between degrees, indeterminacy, and multidimensionality.
structural correspondenceinterpretation functionmeasures of analogicity
2023STRUCTURE · REPRESENTATION · MATHEMATICS
We argue that analog representation is a matter of structural correspondence between vehicles and contents, and that questions about representational format ultimately depend on the rules governing a system's interpretation function. We develop three degree-theoretic measures of structural correspondence that capture distinct ways a system can be more or less analog.
value of consciousnessformal ethicswelfare goods
2023CONSCIOUSNESS · ETHICS · MATHEMATICS Some philosophers have argued that life itself is valuable, independent of the goods and bads within it. I argue that such views face a dilemma: either (1) good human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living.
moral statusanimal ethicswelfare
2022Journal of Consciousness Studies29 (3–4): 205–228
CONSCIOUSNESS · ETHICS Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn't matter morally. Some philosophers have argued that this asymmetry is untenable. I explain why such claims are unfounded: speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism.
quality spacesregional frameworkphenomenal precision
2021CONSCIOUSNESS · STRUCTURE · METAPHYSICS · PERCEPTION · REPRESENTATION · MATHEMATICS
I argue that the standard framework for modeling mental qualities—where qualities are represented via points in geometric spaces—is structurally inadequate. Then I develop a new mathematical framework—the regional framework—that is more powerful and flexible. The regional framework can capture phenomenal imprecision, disentangles two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, and illustrates how phenomenal qualities are structurally different from perceptible qualities.
microphenomenologyintrospectionluminosity
2019CONSCIOUSNESS · STRUCTURE · METAPHYSICS · EPISTEMOLOGY · REPRESENTATION I develop and defend the view that experiences might have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties.
intrinsic valueneutral experiencesvalue of consciousness
I argue that consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. While the specific character of an experience may be good or bad, consciousness itself is neutral.
Textbook Chapter
subjectivityphenomenal character
forth.Introducing Philosophy of Mind, TodayRoutledge
CONSCIOUSNESS · METAPHYSICS To be conscious—according to a common metaphor—is for "the lights to be on inside." But there are two ways of interpreting this metaphor, which correspond to two senses of 'phenomenal consciousness'. I explain how disentangling these senses clarifies some questions about degrees, dimensions, and determinacy of consciousness.
Commentaries
2020Animal Sentience
CONSCIOUSNESS · ETHICS