Articles

Argues that 'conscious' sometimes functions as a minimal-standard gradable adjective. Explains why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of 'conscious'. Discusses connections to 'what it's like' expressions, distinguishes two interpretations of 'phenomenal consciousness', and explains how these semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees.

Develops a version of sense-datum theory on which sense-data are neural states presented first-personally, instantiate sensational qualities rather than sensible qualities, and are vehicles rather than objects of perception. Argues that this view warrants the label 'sense-datum theory', and explains how the view resists traditional objections to sense-data.

Argues that structural facts about experience — facts characterizing how conscious experiences are structured — are objective phenomenal facts, even though they still give rise to an explanatory gap.

Examines the epistemology of phenomenal knowledge, investigating what it takes to know the phenomenal character of a conscious experience.

Argues that objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable and develops an analysis of what it is for a property to count as degrees of consciousness. Whether consciousness comes in degrees depends on which theory of mind is correct.

Develops a regional framework: mental qualities are modeled as regions rather than points in quality-spaces. The framework disentangles two kinds of phenomenal similarity and offers new tools for empirical investigation.

Defends the view that experiences have microphenomenal properties — phenomenal properties not accessible to introspection — and explores implications for the structure of consciousness.

Uses the metaphor "to be conscious is for the lights to be on" to disentangle two senses of phenomenal consciousness, showing how questions about degrees and dimensions differ across them.